Speaker: Pskhu Ruzana, doctor of Philosophy, Professor of the Department of the History of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Patrice Lumumba Friendship of Peoples’ University, Russia
Topic: The Distinction Between Functional Styles in the Philosophical Traditions of India and Europe
Topic: The Distinction Between Functional Styles in the Philosophical Traditions of India and Europe
Abstract
Fundamental differences between types of rationality sometimes “shine through” cultural realities in the most unexpected way, for example, in the Indian caste system. The period of the formation of Indian philosophy, the Shraman period, is characterized, as is known, by the confrontation between Brahmanism and the schools of thought that formed the backbone of anti-Brahman systems, primarily Buddhism, Jainism and Ajivikism. While during the period of the emergence of the global philosophical confrontation, in which I would roughly distinguish two sides (Brahmanism and generally anti-Brahmanism), the subjects of debate were issues of karma, nature or issues of the existence of atman, etc., in the advanced period of the development of Indian philosophy (VII century) one of the most interestingissues, marking the border between Brahmanical thought (most expressively manifested in Mimamsa) and its most fundamental opponent – Buddhism, was the issue of the existence of universals. Despite the fact that at first glance this dispute seems purely philosophical and therefore comparable to a similar phenomenon in Western European philosophy, nevertheless, in the history of Indian philosophy the problem of universals arises in a certain context, which explains their appearance as a “situational” rather than a “planned” emerging phenomenon. When using the example of the usage of the noun “cow”, we can identify two sides of the debate, who are discussing the legitimacy of applying the word “cow” to all cows at any given time. In the past, present, and future, a cow is not the same, but we use the same word. This is possible because the objects themselves, i.e. cows in the past, present, and future, have a certain common property – “cowhood” (Sanskrit, gotva) – a certain universal, which in itself is different from each individual cow, but which unites them all into one class of cows. Two polar views are represented respectively by Brahmanism (the answer is positive – “yes, that’s why”) and Buddhism (the answer is negative – “no, that’s not why”). In the 7th century, mimansak Kumarila Bhatta, in a dispute with the Buddhist Dharmakirti, resorted to universals to justify the legitimacy of the varna system: All brahmans are united by one common property or universal – brahmanism, due to which brahmans differ from all other people (as cows differ from horses, etc.). If we recall the words of the outstanding Russian Indologist S.F. Oldenburg (1863-1934) that it was the brahmans who invented the seemingly “disintegrating principle of caste,” but which, nevertheless, “fused India together into a country of one culture,” then we can talk about the existence of a certain paradigm (in the first sense of the ancient Greek word παράδειγμα as an example, model, or pattern) in Brahman culture, which explains the social structure of ancient Indian society, and the establishment of all philosophical systems of classical Indian philosophy, united by the name āstika (recognizing the Vedas), and the grammatical structure of Sanskrit in the work of Panini, and many other realities of Brahman culture. The presentation, by comparing the Indian model of social structure with the Muslim model of reconstruction proposed by Muhammad Iqbal, shows the fact that the dispute about the existence of philosophical universals in India correlates with the basis of its social structure, and both are founded in the paradigmaticity of the Brahmanical way of thought, introducing into the culture of India a specific model-forming principle of so-called originality [of an example] (Sanskrit, ādi).
Fundamental differences between types of rationality sometimes “shine through” cultural realities in the most unexpected way, for example, in the Indian caste system. The period of the formation of Indian philosophy, the Shraman period, is characterized, as is known, by the confrontation between Brahmanism and the schools of thought that formed the backbone of anti-Brahman systems, primarily Buddhism, Jainism and Ajivikism. While during the period of the emergence of the global philosophical confrontation, in which I would roughly distinguish two sides (Brahmanism and generally anti-Brahmanism), the subjects of debate were issues of karma, nature or issues of the existence of atman, etc., in the advanced period of the development of Indian philosophy (VII century) one of the most interestingissues, marking the border between Brahmanical thought (most expressively manifested in Mimamsa) and its most fundamental opponent – Buddhism, was the issue of the existence of universals. Despite the fact that at first glance this dispute seems purely philosophical and therefore comparable to a similar phenomenon in Western European philosophy, nevertheless, in the history of Indian philosophy the problem of universals arises in a certain context, which explains their appearance as a “situational” rather than a “planned” emerging phenomenon. When using the example of the usage of the noun “cow”, we can identify two sides of the debate, who are discussing the legitimacy of applying the word “cow” to all cows at any given time. In the past, present, and future, a cow is not the same, but we use the same word. This is possible because the objects themselves, i.e. cows in the past, present, and future, have a certain common property – “cowhood” (Sanskrit, gotva) – a certain universal, which in itself is different from each individual cow, but which unites them all into one class of cows. Two polar views are represented respectively by Brahmanism (the answer is positive – “yes, that’s why”) and Buddhism (the answer is negative – “no, that’s not why”). In the 7th century, mimansak Kumarila Bhatta, in a dispute with the Buddhist Dharmakirti, resorted to universals to justify the legitimacy of the varna system: All brahmans are united by one common property or universal – brahmanism, due to which brahmans differ from all other people (as cows differ from horses, etc.). If we recall the words of the outstanding Russian Indologist S.F. Oldenburg (1863-1934) that it was the brahmans who invented the seemingly “disintegrating principle of caste,” but which, nevertheless, “fused India together into a country of one culture,” then we can talk about the existence of a certain paradigm (in the first sense of the ancient Greek word παράδειγμα as an example, model, or pattern) in Brahman culture, which explains the social structure of ancient Indian society, and the establishment of all philosophical systems of classical Indian philosophy, united by the name āstika (recognizing the Vedas), and the grammatical structure of Sanskrit in the work of Panini, and many other realities of Brahman culture. The presentation, by comparing the Indian model of social structure with the Muslim model of reconstruction proposed by Muhammad Iqbal, shows the fact that the dispute about the existence of philosophical universals in India correlates with the basis of its social structure, and both are founded in the paradigmaticity of the Brahmanical way of thought, introducing into the culture of India a specific model-forming principle of so-called originality [of an example] (Sanskrit, ādi).
Fundamental differences between types of rationality sometimes “shine through” cultural realities in the most unexpected way, for example, in the Indian caste system. The period of the formation of Indian philosophy, the Shraman period, is characterized, as is known, by the confrontation between Brahmanism and the schools of thought that formed the backbone of anti-Brahman systems, primarily Buddhism, Jainism and Ajivikism. While during the period of the emergence of the global philosophical confrontation, in which I would roughly distinguish two sides (Brahmanism and generally anti-Brahmanism), the subjects of debate were issues of karma, nature or issues of the existence of atman, etc., in the advanced period of the development of Indian philosophy (VII century) one of the most interestingissues, marking the border between Brahmanical thought (most expressively manifested in Mimamsa) and its most fundamental opponent – Buddhism, was the issue of the existence of universals. Despite the fact that at first glance this dispute seems purely philosophical and therefore comparable to a similar phenomenon in Western European philosophy, nevertheless, in the history of Indian philosophy the problem of universals arises in a certain context, which explains their appearance as a “situational” rather than a “planned” emerging phenomenon. When using the example of the usage of the noun “cow”, we can identify two sides of the debate, who are discussing the legitimacy of applying the word “cow” to all cows at any given time. In the past, present, and future, a cow is not the same, but we use the same word. This is possible because the objects themselves, i.e. cows in the past, present, and future, have a certain common property – “cowhood” (Sanskrit, gotva) – a certain universal, which in itself is different from each individual cow, but which unites them all into one class of cows. Two polar views are represented respectively by Brahmanism (the answer is positive – “yes, that’s why”) and Buddhism (the answer is negative – “no, that’s not why”). In the 7th century, mimansak Kumarila Bhatta, in a dispute with the Buddhist Dharmakirti, resorted to universals to justify the legitimacy of the varna system: All brahmans are united by one common property or universal – brahmanism, due to which brahmans differ from all other people (as cows differ from horses, etc.). If we recall the words of the outstanding Russian Indologist S.F. Oldenburg (1863-1934) that it was the brahmans who invented the seemingly “disintegrating principle of caste,” but which, nevertheless, “fused India together into a country of one culture,” then we can talk about the existence of a certain paradigm (in the first sense of the ancient Greek word παράδειγμα as an example, model, or pattern) in Brahman culture, which explains the social structure of ancient Indian society, and the establishment of all philosophical systems of classical Indian philosophy, united by the name āstika (recognizing the Vedas), and the grammatical structure of Sanskrit in the work of Panini, and many other realities of Brahman culture. The presentation, by comparing the Indian model of social structure with the Muslim model of reconstruction proposed by Muhammad Iqbal, shows the fact that the dispute about the existence of philosophical universals in India correlates with the basis of its social structure, and both are founded in the paradigmaticity of the Brahmanical way of thought, introducing into the culture of India a specific model-forming principle of so-called originality [of an example] (Sanskrit, ādi).
Fundamental differences between types of rationality sometimes “shine through” cultural realities in the most unexpected way, for example, in the Indian caste system. The period of the formation of Indian philosophy, the Shraman period, is characterized, as is known, by the confrontation between Brahmanism and the schools of thought that formed the backbone of anti-Brahman systems, primarily Buddhism, Jainism and Ajivikism. While during the period of the emergence of the global philosophical confrontation, in which I would roughly distinguish two sides (Brahmanism and generally anti-Brahmanism), the subjects of debate were issues of karma, nature or issues of the existence of atman, etc., in the advanced period of the development of Indian philosophy (VII century) one of the most interestingissues, marking the border between Brahmanical thought (most expressively manifested in Mimamsa) and its most fundamental opponent – Buddhism, was the issue of the existence of universals. Despite the fact that at first glance this dispute seems purely philosophical and therefore comparable to a similar phenomenon in Western European philosophy, nevertheless, in the history of Indian philosophy the problem of universals arises in a certain context, which explains their appearance as a “situational” rather than a “planned” emerging phenomenon. When using the example of the usage of the noun “cow”, we can identify two sides of the debate, who are discussing the legitimacy of applying the word “cow” to all cows at any given time. In the past, present, and future, a cow is not the same, but we use the same word. This is possible because the objects themselves, i.e. cows in the past, present, and future, have a certain common property – “cowhood” (Sanskrit, gotva) – a certain universal, which in itself is different from each individual cow, but which unites them all into one class of cows. Two polar views are represented respectively by Brahmanism (the answer is positive – “yes, that’s why”) and Buddhism (the answer is negative – “no, that’s not why”). In the 7th century, mimansak Kumarila Bhatta, in a dispute with the Buddhist Dharmakirti, resorted to universals to justify the legitimacy of the varna system: All brahmans are united by one common property or universal – brahmanism, due to which brahmans differ from all other people (as cows differ from horses, etc.). If we recall the words of the outstanding Russian Indologist S.F. Oldenburg (1863-1934) that it was the brahmans who invented the seemingly “disintegrating principle of caste,” but which, nevertheless, “fused India together into a country of one culture,” then we can talk about the existence of a certain paradigm (in the first sense of the ancient Greek word παράδειγμα as an example, model, or pattern) in Brahman culture, which explains the social structure of ancient Indian society, and the establishment of all philosophical systems of classical Indian philosophy, united by the name āstika (recognizing the Vedas), and the grammatical structure of Sanskrit in the work of Panini, and many other realities of Brahman culture. The presentation, by comparing the Indian model of social structure with the Muslim model of reconstruction proposed by Muhammad Iqbal, shows the fact that the dispute about the existence of philosophical universals in India correlates with the basis of its social structure, and both are founded in the paradigmaticity of the Brahmanical way of thought, introducing into the culture of India a specific model-forming principle of so-called originality [of an example] (Sanskrit, ādi).